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Abstract. We use an algebraic viewpoint, namely a matrix framework
to deal with the problem of resource allocation under uncertainty in the
context of a qualitative approach. Our basic qualitative data are a plau-
sibility relation over the resources, a hierarchical relation over the agents
and of course the preference that the agents have over the resources. With
this data we propose a qualitative binary relation D between allocations
such that F D G has the following intended meaning: the allocation F
produces more or equal social welfare than the allocation G. We prove
that there is a family of allocations which are maximal with respect to
D. We prove also that there is a notion of simple deal such that opti-
mal allocations can be reached by sequences of simple deals. Finally, we
introduce some mechanism for discriminating optimal allocations.
Keywords: Resource allocation · Optimal allocations · Social welfare · Quali-
tative framework
1 Introduction
The task of distribution of a divisible or indivisible set of goods among a set
of agents has been studied mainly in Economics. The mathematical models of
fair distributions, in particular when the goods are divisible, have been studied
by some mathematicians and economists such as Banach and Steinhaus [19,20]
before the middle of the Twentieth century and by Brams, Taylor, Zwicker and
others towards the end of the past century [4,3,6] (for a good survey see [5]).
Some axiomatic analysis about resource allocation problems have been done
by Moulin, Thomson and Bevi among others[14,21,2]. In more recent years the
⋆ The third author is supported by the Project CDCHTA-ULA C-1855-13-05-A.
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mathematical models of satisfactory distributions have occupied different com-
munities of researchers besides economists. Among them, computer scientists
working in the area of Artificial Intelligence and Multi-agent Systems, see for
instance the works of Sandholm [17,18], Endriss et al. [11] and Chevaleyre et al.
[7,8].
The problem concerning this paper is the distribution of a finite set of indi-
visible goods (resources) into a finite set of individuals (agents). This is known
as the problem of resource allocation. There are many concerns about this prob-
lem. The first one is how to consider a determined allocation satisfactory. To deal
with this aspect some concepts of social welfare are used, most of them coming
from aggregation of numerical functions of individual utility [12,11]. Thus, the
notion of optimal allocation arises naturally as the one producing the maximal
social welfare.
Another important aspect studied is the rationality of negotiation between
agents in order to reach better resource allocations. Again here the notion of
being better is closely connected to the improvement of the social welfare [17,11].
From the algorithmic point of view it is important that these negotiations be
simple and that any sequence of these simple negotiations ends in an optimal
allocation.
In this work we continue an investigation of these problems in which we don’t
use numbers. That is, we propose a qualitative notion of preference between the
allocations that is based only on the knowledge of the set of resources that agents
desire, a plausibility relation between set of resources, and a hierarchical relation
between agents. In the works of Pino Pe´rez and colleagues [15,16] three strong
hypothesis were made. First, it was assumed that there was a linear order over
the resources. Second, that the plausibility relation between the resources was
the possibilistic relation associated to this linear order. Third, it was supposed
that there was a linear order between agents encoding a hierarchy between them.
In this work we generalize these three assumptions. We suppose now that the
relation between the resources and the relation between the agents are total
preorders. We suppose also that the plausibility relation between the sets of
resources is a lifting (an extension, see [1]) of the relation between the resources
with very few properties.
With these tools we use the dominance plausible rule -a sort of qualitative
expected utility introduced by Dubois et al. [9,10]- in order to compare two
allocations. We show with easy matricial representations that there is a family
of optimal allocations. We propose a notion of simple rational deal and we prove
that we can reach optimal allocations by sequences of simple rational deals.
This work is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the basic notions. Sec-
tion 3 contains the notion of preference between allocations based on a plausi-
bility relation between sets of resources which in turn is based on a qualitative
notion of social welfare. Section 4 is devoted to the notion of simple rational
deals. Section 5 is devoted to define good resource allocations and to see that
they can be reached by sequences of simple rational deals. In Section 6 we see
that good resource allocations are, indeed, optimal with respect to the notion
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of qualitative welfare. Section 7 is devoted to a method to discriminate optimal
good allocations. We finish with Section 8 in which we make some concluding
remarks and present some lines of future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we show the preliminary concepts and notation that we will use
throughout the article. Given a nonempty set X and a binary relation  defined
on X . The strict relation ≻ associated to  is defined as
a ≻ b⇔ [(a  b) ∧ ¬(b  a)], (1)
the indifferent relation ⋍ is defined as
a ⋍ b⇔ [(a  b) ∧ (b  a)]. (2)
If A ⊆ X , we denote the maximal elements of A as max(A) and analogously
we denote the minimal elements of A as min(A)
If X is finite, X = {x1, · · · , xn}, the relation  defines a relation matrix as:
Xij =
{
1, if xi  xj ;
0, otherwise.
(3)
Note that the previous matrix depends upon the order of the elements of X .
But any reordering of the elements of X has an associated relation matrix with
respect to  closely related to the first matrix. More precisely, if (Xij)n×n and
(Yij)n×n are matrices associated to  with two different orders of X , then there
exists a permutation P , of the identity matrix In of orden n, such that
(Yij)n×n = P (Xij)n×n
A relation is a total pre-order on X if it is total and transitive. A relation is
a linear order if it is irreflexive and transitive.
We start by the defining the two main sets to be studied. These are the set
of agents and the set of resources. We will denote the set of agents by A which
is defined as a finite, nonempty set with |A| = q, i.e, A = {1, 2, · · · , q}. We
will assume there exists a total pre-order h defined on A. Given two agents
i, j ∈ A, the symbol i h j will be interpreted as: agent i has a higher or equal
hierarchy than agent j. The strict relation ≻h associated to h defined as (1)
can be thought as: agent i has greater hierarchy than agent j. The indifferent
relation ∼h defined as in (2) can be interpreted as: agent i has the same hierarchy
as agent j. Sometimes we will abuse the notation and denote by i ∈ A an agent
and at the same time a natural number between 1 and q. A relation matrix
associated to h, defined as in equation (3) will be called a hierarchy matrix
and denoted by Ah = (aij)q×q.
The set of resources will be denoted as R = {r1, · · · , rk}. We will assume
that a total pre-order 
R
, is defined on R. The strict and indifferent relations
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≻
R
and ≃
R
, are defined in similar way as in equations (1) and (2), respectively.
Based on the relation 
R
we will later define a binary relation ⊒ on the set of
subsets of R, denoted as P(R). Such relation should be a lifting of 
R
, in the
sense that it should preserve the order 
R
when restricted to the the singletons.
Such relation will be understood as a ‘plausibility’ relation on P(R).
Once defined the sets A andR, we will assume that each agent is interested in
some resources. This relation can be recorded in the following matrix of request
P = (Pin)q×k that contains the information about the resources each agent
requests.
Pin =
{
1, if agent i requests the resource rn;
0, otherwise.
(4)
Remark 1. Sometimes, we will refer to a resource r ∈ R without specifying the
subindex. In such cases, Pir denotes the entry of the matrix P in the i-th row
and the column associated to the resource r.
We make the assumptions that the agents either request or do not request a
resource, that this is known beforehand, and that it is invariant. Also, we assume
that an agent does not have different levels of preference over the resources. This
is a subject that could be addressed in future research. Under this conditions, we
notice that the i−th row of P contains complete information about the resources
that agent i requests, whereas the n−th column determines all the agents that
request the resource rn.
We are now ready to define the main concept of the article. A resource allo-
cation is a distribution of the resources among the agents where each resource
is granted to one and only one agent. We introduce a matrix notation that will
be used throughout the rest of the article.
Definition 1 Let A and R be nonempty sets, with k = |R| and q = |A|. A
resource allocation is a matrix
F = (fin)q×k
such that for each 1 ≤ n ≤ k, there exists a unique 1 ≤ i ≤ q for which fin = 1
and fjn = 0 for j 6= i.
Notice that if fin = 1 then it is understood that agent i is the only one who was
granted the resource rn.
Similarly to the notation used with the matrix of requests, we will write fir to
denote the entry of the matrix F corresponding to the i-th row and the column
associated to the resource r.
Sometimes we will use a set of resource allocations F1, . . . ,Fm. In such case,
we will use the notation Fl = (f lin)q×k when necessary.
Given a fixed resource r ∈ R, we define a “priority relation” on A associated
to r in the following way: agent i has a higher priority than agent j if and only
if agent i has equal or grater hierarchy than agent j and agent i requests the
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resource r, or agent i does not have equal or greater hierarchy than agent j and
agent j does not request the resource r.
Definition 2 Given r ∈ R, the priority matrix associated to r, is the matrix
(arij)q×q, where
arij = aijPir + (1− aij)(1− Pjr) (5)
Notice that each term of equation (5) is either one or zero. If aijPir = 1 then
agent i has a higher hierarchy than agent j and agent i requests resource r. On
the other hand, if (1− aij)(1−Pjr) = 1, then aij = 0 and Pjr = 0. This implies
agent i doest not have a higher hierarchy than agent j and agent j does not
request resource r. This definition captures that on [16] were the hierarchy order
is assumed to be a linear order.
3 Classifying allocations
As a first step in classifying resource allocations, we want to define an equiva-
lence relation among allocations. Then we will define the set where one resource
allocation dominates another.
Definition 3 Let r ∈ R and let c and c∗ be two canonical vectors of size q.
Suppose that i, j ∈ A are such that the i-th entry of c is equal to 1 and the j-th
entry of c∗ is equal to 1. We will say that c and c∗ are r-equivalent, denoted as
c ≡r c∗ if agents i and j have the same hierarchy and the same preference over
the resource r. In other words,
c ≡r c
∗ ⇔ (aij = aji = 1) ∧ (Pir = Pjr) (6)
Let F and G be two resource allocations and define the set of all non-r-
equivalent columns as
DFG = {r ∈ R : c
F
r 6≡r c
G
r } (7)
where cFr and c
G
r denote the columns of F and G, respectively, associated to the
resource r. Notice that DFG = DGF .
We will define a set where the resource allocation F dominates the resource
allocation G. Roughly, this will be the set of resources that are assigned under
F to an agent with higher priority than if assigned under G.
Definition 4 Let F = (fin) and G = (gin) be two resource allocations. The set
[F ≻ G] where F dominates G, is defined as:
[F ≻ G] = {r ∈ DFG : a
r
ij = 1, where fir = 1 and gjr = 1} (8)
In other words, r ∈ [F ≻ G] if and only if for the unique agents i and j such
that fir = 1 and gjr = 1 it holds that a
r
ij = 1 and the columns (fir)1≤i≤q and
(gir)1≤i≤q are not r-equivalent. .
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Once we have defined dominant sets as subsets of R, we will define a way of
comparing resource allocations. The idea is to capture a notion of social welfare
[12,13,11] used to compare allocations via a notion of qualitative welfare. The
notion we use next is inspired of the dominance plausible rule proposed by Dubois
el al. [9,10].
Definition 5 Let ⊒ a plausibility relation on the set P(R). We say that the
resource allocation F produces more social welfare than a resource allocation G,
denoted as F D G, if
[F ≻ G] ⊒ [G ≻ F ]. (9)
Moreover, we will say that F ⊲ G if F D G and ¬(G D F).
Notice that the previous definition depends on a binary relation on P(R)
that, for now, could be arbitrary. A similar approach was studied in [16] where a
strict possibilistic relation was considered for the case in which 
R
was a linear
order. Indeed our relation ⊒ will be an extension (see [1] for a study of the
ways to do extensions and their properties) of the relation 
R
having very few
properties.
We are ready to define the notion of optimality among resource allocations.
Notice that such definition will depend on the binary relation ⊒.
Definition 6 Given a binary relation ⊒ on the set P(R). We will say that a
resource allocation F∗ is optimal if F∗ D G for every resource allocation G.
Here it is relevant to say that optimal resource allocations need not to be
unique since the previous definition does not distinguish among equivalent allo-
cations.
4 Simple and rational deals
In order to search for an optimal resource allocation, we will first introduce
negotiation concepts. By a deal we will understand a pair of allocations that are
equal except for only one column. We will define the concept in a more rigorous
way by making use of permutation matrices.
Denote as Iq the identity matrix of size q × q. A permutation matrix Eij is
the result of interchanging the rows i and j of Iq. Clearly, Eij = Eji .
Definition 7 Given two resource allocations F and G such that F 6= G, we
say that the pair (F ,G) is a simple deal if there exists a unique r ∈ R and
a permutation matrix Eij 6= Iq, such that if F = [c1, · · · , cr−1, cr, cr+1 · · · ck],
where c1, . . . , ck denote the columns of F , then
G = [c1, · · · , cr−1, Eijcr, cr+1 · · · ck].
Lemma 1 If (F ,G) is a simple deal, then the permutation matrix Eij is unique.
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Proof. Suppose that F = (fin)q×k, and G = (gin)q×k are two resource allocations
such that (F ,G) is a simple deal, then there exists a unique resource r such that
F and G differ only in the column associated to resource r. Let i ∈ A and j ∈ A
be such that fir = 1 and gjr = 1, then fi∗r = 0 for all i
∗ 6= i and gj∗r = 0 for all
j∗ 6= j.
Now if Ei∗j∗ , is another permutation matrix, with i
∗ 6= i or j∗ 6= j, then
either fi∗r = 0 or gj∗r = 0 and consequently Ei∗j∗cr 6= Eijcr, where cr is the
r-th column of F .
Using the notation of the previous lemma, we will say that the permutation
matrix Eij represents the simple deal (F ,G) associated to the resource r ∈ R.
Definition 8 Given two resource allocations F and G, we will say that (F ,G)
is a rational deal if it is a simple deal represented by the permutation matrix Eij,
and if one of the following conditions holds.
(aji = 1) ∧ (Pjr = 1) (10)
or
(aij = 1) ∧ (∀t, (ati = 1⇒ Ptr = 0)) (11)
Condition (10) means that agent j has a higher or equal hierarchy than i
and moreover, requests resource r. Condition (11) says that agent i has a higher
or equal hierarchy than j, that i does not request the resource r and no other
agent t with higher or equal hierarchy as i requests the resource r.
Definition 9 A sequence of resource allocations F1,F2, . . . ,Fm is called se-
quence of rational deals if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, the pair (Fi,Fi+1) is a
rational deal.
The following lemma and the corollary that follows will be needed in Section
6.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the permutation matrices Eij y Ei∗j∗ represent, respec-
tively, the rational deals (F1,F2) and (F2,F3) associated to the same resource
r ∈ R. Then the product Eij∗ = Ei∗j∗Eij also represents a rational deal associ-
ated to r.
Proof. We will show that the matrix E = Ei∗j∗Eij represents the rational deal
(F1,F3) associated to r. First, notice that i∗ = j and E = Eij∗ .
Suppose that F1 = [c1, . . . , cr, . . . , ck], then since (F1,F2) and (F2,F3) are
simple deals, we can write
F2 = [c1, . . . , Eijcr, . . . , ck]
and
F3 = [c1, . . . , Ei∗j∗Eijcr, . . . , ck] = [c1, . . . , Eij∗cr, . . . , ck].
In consequence, (F1,F3) is a simple deal.
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It remains to show that one of the following conditions hold:
(aj∗i = 1) ∧ (Pj∗r = 1) (12)
or
(aij∗ = 1) ∧ (∀t, (ati = 1⇒ Ptr = 0)). (13)
But since (F1,F2) and (F2,F3) are rational deals, we have
1. Eij represents (F1,F2) and one of the following conditions hold:
(a) (aji = 1) ∧ (Pjr = 1), or
(b) (aij = 1) ∧ (∀t, (ati = 1⇒ Ptr = 0)).
2. Ei∗j∗ represents (F2,F3) and one of the following conditions hold:
(a) (aj∗i∗ = 1) ∧ (Pj∗r = 1), or
(b) (ai∗j∗ = 1) ∧ (∀t, (ati∗ = 1⇒ Ptr = 0)).
If (1a) and (2a) hold, then aji = 1 and aj∗i∗ = 1 and since the relation h is
transitive and i∗ = j, then aj∗i = 1. Moreover, from (2a), we have that Pj∗r = 1
and consequently (12) holds.
Now suppose that (1b) and (2b) hold. Again by transitivity of h we have that
aij∗ = 1. Moreover, condition (2b) implies (13).
If (1a) and (2b) hold, then Pjr = 1 and Pi∗r = Pjr = 0 which is a contradiction.
Similarly, if (1b) and (2a) hold, then aj∗i = 1 and Pj∗r = 1 and taking t = j
∗ in
(2a), we have that Pj∗r = 0. Again a contradiction.
Hence, neither conditions (1a) and (2b) nor conditions (1b) and (2a) occur at
the same time. This finishes the proof.
The previous lemma can be generalized using mathematical induction to
obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the permutation matrices Ei1j1 , Ei2j2 , . . . , Eimjm rep-
resent consecutive rational deals associated to the same resource r. Then j1 = i2,
j2 = i3, · · · , jm−1 = im, and Ei1jm = Eimjm · · ·Ei2j2Ei1j1 is a permutation ma-
trix that also represents a rational deal associated to the resource r.
5 Good allocations
Our goal will be to construct an algorithm to find optimal resource allocations.
Before, we will define what “good” resource allocations are.
Definition 10 Let F = (fin)q×k be a resource allocation and fix r ∈ R. Suppose
i ∈ A is the only agent such that fir = 1. We will say that the column cr =
(fir)1≤i≤q, associated to the resource r, is in good position if
(Pir = 1) ∧ (∀t(ati = 1 ∧ ait = 0)⇒ Ptr = 0)) (14)
or
(∀t(Ptr = 0)) ∧ (i ∈ min(A)) (15)
where min(A) = {t ∈ A : ait = 1, ∀i ∈ A}.
We will say the F is a good resource allocation if all its columns are in good
position.
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Condition (14) can be interpreted as: Agent i requests the resource r and
every other agent with higher hierarchy does not request it. Condition (15) says
that agent i has the lowest possible hierarchy and no agents requests the resource
r. A good resource allocation will then be an allocation in which each resource is
either assigned to an agent that requests it and has the higher hierarchy among
those that request the resource, or to an agent of the lowest hierarchy if no agent
requests the resource.
The following lemma says that a column that is in good position cannot be
further “improved” by using a rational deal.
Lemma 3 Suppose that the r-th column cr of a resource allocation F is in
good position and that there exists a resource allocation G such that (F ,G) is a
rational deal associated to cr, represented by the matrix Eij . Then cr and Eijcr
are equivalent.
Proof. Suppose F = [c1, . . . , cr, · · · , ck], we will prove that aij = 1 = aji and
Pir = Pjr . Since h is total we consider the following two cases:
If aji = 1, then condition (10) holds and consequently we have that Pjr = 1
and condition (15) does not hold. But since cr is in good position, then (14) holds
and consequently Pir = 1 and aij = 1. Hence cr and Eijcr are r-equivalent.
Condition aij = 1 and aji = 0 is impossible since if this were the case, then
condition (11) holds and consequently Pir = 0. Moreover i /∈ min(A). This two
facts contradict conditions (14) and (15), respectively. This finishes the proof.
The following lemma says that if the column involved in a simple deal turns
out to be in good position, then the deal must be rational.
Lemma 4 Suppose F and G are two resource allocations and that (F ,G) is a
simple deal that converts column cr to Eijcr. If Eijcr is in good position and it
is not equivalent to cr, then (F ,G) is a rational deal.
Proof. We need to show that one of the conditions (10) or (11) hold. We will
use again the totality of h and consider cases. Suppose that aji = 1, then we
have that j 6∈ min(A) since otherwise aij = 1 and by condition (15) Pir = 0 =
Pjr , contradicting the hypothesis that Eijcr and cr are not equivalent. Hence,
condition (14) holds and consequently Pjr = 1 and (10) holds.
Now suppose that aij = 1 and aji = 0, if condition (15) holds, then in
particular we have that condition (11) holds. If on the contrary, condition (14)
holds, then Pjr = 1 and Pir = 0 and moreover, for every t ∈ A such that ati = 1
we have by transitivity that atj = 1 and ajt = 0 which, by condition (14) implies
that Ptn = 0 proving that condition (11) holds.
Remark 2. The converse of the previous lemma is not generally true. That is,
the resulting column involved in a rational deal, needs not to be in good position.
Lemma 5 If F = [c1, · · · , cr, · · · ck] is resource allocation such that the column
cr is not good position, then there exists a rational deal which transforms it in a
good column.
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Proof. Let cr the column in not good position. We want to find a resource
allocation G such that (F ,G) is a rational deal associated to the resource in the
position r and that leaves cr in good position.
Let i ∈ A be the only agent such that fir = 1. Define
Ir = {t ∈ A : t 6= i ∧ Ptr = 1}
If Ir = ∅, let j be any element in min(A). If Ir 6= ∅, let j be any element in
max(Ir).
Now, if F = (fin)q×k = [c1, · · · , cr · · · , ck], let’s define the resource allocation
G = [c1, · · · , Eijcr · · · , ck]. Clearly (F ,G) is a simple deal. To show that it is
actually a rational deal, we will show that Eijcr is in good position, and since
it is not equivalent to cr, and then use lemma 4.
We will consider each case, Ir = ∅ and Ir 6= ∅, separately:
Suppose first that Ir = ∅, then ∀t ∈ A, t 6= i we have that Ptr = 0. Thus Pir = 0
since otherwise condition (14) would hold and cr would be in good position,
contradicting the hypothesis. Consequently, for every t ∈ A, Ptr = 0 and since
j ∈ min(A), then condition (15) holds. Hence, Eijcr is in good position.
Now suppose that Ir 6= ∅, then Pjr = 1 and j ∈ max(Ir). Consequently, if t ∈ A
is such that t 6= i, atj = 1 and ajt = 0, we have that j /∈ Ir and therefore Ptr = 0.
Moreover, it can not happen that aij = 1 and aji = 0 and Pir = 1 since the
maximality of j will then imply that Ptr = 0 for every t ∈ A such that ati = 1
but this implies that condition (14) holds for i reaching a contradiction. Thus,
condition (14) holds for j and hence Eijcr is in good position.
The following theorem shows that any resource allocation can be converted
into a good resource allocation by means of a finite sequence of rational deals.
The proof of the theorem gives us an algorithm that will later result in an optimal
resource allocation as we will see in Corollary 2.
Theorem 1 Suppose F is not a good resource allocation and let l be the number
of columns of F that are not in good position. Then there exists a sequence of
rational deals F1, · · · ,Fl+1 such that F1 = F and Fl+1 is a good allocation.
Proof. Let C = {cn1 , · · · , cnl}, 1 ≤ n1 < · · · < nl ≤ k, the set of columns that
are not in good position of F . Obviously, l ≥ 1. For cn1 , define
F1 = F = (c1, · · · , cn1 , · · · , ck).
By Lemma 5, there exists a rational deal (F1,F2) associated to cn1 such that
F2 = (c1, · · · , Ei1j1cn1 , · · · , ck)
and Ei1j1cn1 is in a good position. If l = 1, then F2 is a good allocation and this
finishes the proof.
Now, suppose that l > 1. Using the same reasoning, construct the resource
allocations F3, . . . ,Fl+1 until a good resource allocation is reached. 
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Algorithm 1.1: Algorithm for a good allocation
Input (F , Ah, P) {F allcation, Ah hierarchy matrix, P requests matrix, k
number of resources, and q number of agents}
F∗ = F
m ∈ min(Ah)
r = 1
while r ≤ k do
Cr = (ftr)1≤t≤q ; {column of resource in the position r}
i = “position of Cr iqual to 1”;
I(r) = {t : t 6= i, ∧Ptr = 1}
w = max(I(r))
if Pir=1 and


q∑
t=1,t 6=i
ati(1− ait)(1− Ptr) =
q∑
t=1,t 6=i
ati(1− ait)


or
q∑
t=1
(Ptr + (1− ait)) = 0 then
Cr is a good position
r = r + 1
else
if
q∑
t=1
Ptr = 0 then
j = m
else
j = w
Cr = EijCr {Eij permutation matrix }
F = F∗
r = r + 1
Exit(F∗)
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6 Optimal resource allocations
In this subsection we will show that good resource allocations are actually op-
timal under the Definition 6 as long as the relation ⊒ is positive. First we need
two technical lemmas.
Lemma 6 Let F and G be two resource allocations, then
DFG = [F ≻ G] ∪ [G ≻ F ] and [F ≻ G] ∩ [G ≻ F ] = ∅
Proof. If DFG = ∅, then [F ≻ G] = ∅ = [G ≻ F ]. Suppose that DFG 6= ∅.
It is clear that [F ≻ G] ∪ [G ≻ F ] ⊆ DFG . It remains to show that DFG ⊆
[F ≻ G] ∪ [G ≻ F ]. Let r ∈ DFG and let i, j ∈ A be the only agents such that
fir = 1 = gjr.
Suppose first that aij 6= aji, then from equation (5) we have that either
arij = Pir and a
r
ji = 1− Pir
or
arij = 1− Pjr and a
r
ji = Pjr .
In any of these cases, either arij = 1 or a
r
ji = 1. Thus, r ∈ [F ≻ G] ∪ [G ≻ F ].
Suppose now that aij = aji. Then since r ∈ DFG we have that Pir 6= Pir. Again
by equation (5) we have that either
arij = Pir and a
r
ji = Pjr
or
arij = 1− Pjr and a
r
ji = 1− Pir .
And since Pir 6= Pjr , the previous statement implies that r ∈ [F ≻ G] or
r ∈ [G ≻ F ]. Hence, DFG ⊆ [F ≻ G] ∪ [G ≻ F ].
On the other hand, suppose that r ∈ [F ≻ G] ∩ [G ≻ F ]. Then r ∈ DFG and
there exist agents i, j ∈ A such that fir = 1 = gjr, and arij = 1 = a
r
ji.
From equation (5), exactly one of the following two possibilities happens:
aijPir = 1 = ajiPjr
or
(1− aij)(1 − Pjr) = 1 = (1− aji)(1− Pir)
In both cases, aij = aji and Pir = Pjr contradicting the hypothesis that
clr 6≡r c
p
r . Hence, [F ≻ G] ∩ [G ≻ F ] = ∅.
Proposition 1 Let F1,F1, . . . ,Fn be a sequence of rational deals. Then for every
1 < p ≤ n, we have that D1,p = [Fp ≻ F1], where D1,p is an abbreviation of for
DF1Fp.
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Proof. Let 1 < p ≤ n be fixed. Clearly,
[Fp ≻ F1] ⊂ D1,p
It remains to show that D1,p ⊂ [Fp ≻ F1]. Let r ∈ D1,p and let i, j ∈ A be
the only agents such that f1ir = 1 = f
p
jr. We will show that
arji = 1 = ajiPjr + (1 − aji)(1 − Pir)
Let l ≤ p be the number of rational deals from the sequence F1,F2, . . . ,Fp
associated to the resource r. Let G1, G2, · · · Gl+1 be the subsequence of rational
deals of F1,F2, . . . ,Fp that involve only the resource r. G1 = F1 and Gl = Fp. Let
Ei1j1 , Ei2j2 , · · · , Eiljl be the permutation matrices that represent the rational
deals (G1,G2), · · · , (Gl,Gl+1), respectively. Notice that i = i1, j1 = i2, j2 =
i3, · · · , jl−1 = il, and jl = j. Using corollary 1, we get that
Eij = Eiljl · · ·Ei2j2Ei1j1
represents a rational deal associated to r. Thus, by Definition 8, it holds that
either
ajiPjr = 1 (16)
or
(aij = 1) ∧ (Pir = 0) ∧ (∀k(aki = 1⇒ Pkr = 0)). (17)
If equation (16) holds, then arji = ajiPjr = 1 and consequently r ∈ [Fp ≻ F1].
Let’s suppose equation (17) holds. Since c1r 6≡r c
p
r then either aij 6= aji or
aij = aji and Pir 6= Pjr .
If aij 6= aji then aji = 0 and since Pir = 0, then (1− aji)(1−Pir) = 1 = arji.
On the other hand, if aij = aji and Pir 6= Pjr , then aji = 1 and Pir = 1 and
consequently, arji = ajiPjr = 1. In both cases we have that r ∈ [Fp ≻ F1].
Thus D1p ⊂ [Fp ≻ F1] and this finishes the proof.
Lemma 7 Suppose G is a good resource allocation and F is any resource allo-
cation. Then [G ≻ F ] = DGF
Proof. It is enough to show that DG,F ⊂ [G ≻ F ]. Let r ∈ DG,F and suppose
that i, k ∈ A are the only agents such that gir = 1 and fkr = 1.
We want to show that arik = 1 where
arik = aikPir + (1− aik)(1− Pkr) (18)
Case 1: Pir = 1. Then either aik = 1 or aki = 0.
If aik = 1, then pluging in equation (18), we have that a
r
ik = 1.
If aik = 0, then since h is total, then aki = 1. Now, since the any column
of the allocation G is in good position, then condition and Pir = 1, then (14)
holds:
(Pir = 1) ∧ (∀j(aji = 1 ∧ aij = 0)⇒ Pjm = 0).
Thus, aki = 1 and aik = 0 imply that Pkr = 0. Plugging in equation (18),
we conclude that arik = 1.
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Case 2: Pir = 0. Again using the hypothesis that any column of G is in good
position, condition (15) holds:
∀j(Pjr = 0) ∧ (i ∈ min(A)).
In consequence, Pkr = 0 and aki = 1. Hence Pkr = Pir and since the r
columns in F and G are not equivalent, then we must have that aik = 0.
Pluging in equation 18, we obtain arik = 1.
This finishes the proof.
The next corollary follows from Lemmas 6 and 7.
Corollary 2 Suppose G is a good resource allocation, then for every resource
allocation F we have that [F ≻ G] = ∅.
We are finally ready to prove that good resource allocations and optimal re-
source allocations coincide when the binary relation ⊒ is positive in the following
sense:
Definition 11 Given a binary relation ⊒ defined on P(R), we say that ⊒ is
positive if ∅ ⊒ ∅ and for every set A ∈ P(R), with A 6= ∅ we have that
A ⊒ ∅ ∧ ∅ 6⊒ A.
Theorem 2 Suppose ⊒ is positive. Then any good resource allocation is also an
optimal resource allocation and vice versa.
Proof. Let G be a good resource allocation and F be any resource allocation,
then by Lemma 7 and Corollary 2 we have that
[G ≻ F ] = DGF ⊒ ∅ = [F ≻ G]
and consequently G D F . Thus G is optimal.
Conversely, suppose G not a good resource allocation, then by Theorem 1
and Proposition 1, there exists a good resource allocation F such that [F ≻
G] = DFG , consequently [F ≻ G] = ∅ and by the positivity of ⊒, we have that
F ⊲ G. Thus G is not optimal.
Remark 3. For any two optimal resource allocations F and G it holds that FDG
and G D F .
Corollary 3 Suppose ⊒ is positive, then for every resource allocation F there
exists an optimal resource allocation F∗ such that F∗ D F .
The following corollary justifies the term “optimal allocation” in the sense of the
relation D.
Corollary 4 Suppose ⊒ is positive. Suppose also that G is an optimal resource
allocation and F is a non-optimal resource allocation. Then G ⊲ F .
Proof. Corollary 2 implies that [F ≻ G] = ∅ and the result follows from the
positivity of ⊒.
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7 Discriminating good allocations
In this section we search to discriminate good allocations. We use a criterion of
local satisfaction to compare the the good allocations the relation optimal with
respect this criterion will be the the allocation locally fair.
In order to understand the problems of lack of discrimination let us see the
following example:
Example 1 Let A = {1, 2, 3} and R = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6}. Suppose that all the
agents have equal hierarchy; moreover Agent 3 requests all the resources except
excepto r6; Agent 2 requests the resources r1, r2, r3 and r4 but he doesn’t request
r5 nor r6, whereas agente 1, request the first 3 resources. Then the request matrix
P and the hierarchy matrix Ah are
P =


r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6
1 1 1 1 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 1 0 0
3 1 1 1 1 1 0

 Ah =

1 1 11 1 1
1 1 1


Notice that we can make a partition of R in the subsets {r1, r2 r3}, {r4},
{r5} and {r6}. Any good allocation distributes the resources {r1, r2, r3} among
the agents {1, 2, 3}; {r4} among the agents {2, 3}; the resource {r5} to agent
5 and the resource {r6} among the agents {1, 2, 3}. Now consider the following
allocations:
E =


0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1

, F =


1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1

, G =


1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0

, H =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0


Although all four allocations are good, it seems that some are fairer than
the others. Indeed, E looks very unfair because all the resources are allocated to
the third agent. For example allocation F distributes better the resources than
E. If we now focus only on the subset {r1, r2, r3}, then G and H have a better
local distribution than F . It is then natural to think that we need a criterion to
better distinguish among good allocations. We will develop local criteria in order
to distinguish good allocations. These local criteria will be aggregate in a social
criterion.
Let B the set of good allocations. For each r in R, we define
A(r) = {j ∈ A : ∃F = (fin) ∈ B such that fjr = 1} (19)
It is clear that A(r) 6= ∅. since otherwise, B = ∅. Define R∗ = {s ∈ R :
Pis = 0, ∀i ∈ A}, that is, the set of resources that nobody requests. Notice that
for every r ∈ R∗, A(r) = min(A). If r 6∈ R∗ and i, j ∈ A(r) then i and j request
r, and moreover both agents have the same hierarchy.
On R \R∗ we define the equivalence relation ∼ as
r ∼ s⇔ A(r) = A(s).
16 F. Camacho et al.
We denote by [r] = {s ∈ R \R∗ : A(s) = A(r)} the equivalence class of r on
R \R∗. Suppose that there are l different classes then
R \R∗ = [rm1 ] ∪ [rm2 ] ∪ · · · ∪ [rml ] (20)
If we putR∗ = [rml+1 ], then we have the partitionR = [rm1 ]∪[rm2 ] · · · [rml ]∪
[rml+1 ].
Let F = (fin) be an allocation and r ∈ R. We will denote as F[r] the
submatrix A(r) × [r] of F composed by the rows with the agents in A(r) and
the columns with the resources in [r].
For every agent i ∈ A(r), the number of resources of [r] allocated to a i via
F is
∑
s∈[r] fis. Consider the average of these values:
X(F[r]) =
∑
i∈A(r)
∑
s∈[r]
fis
|A(r)|
. (21)
It is easy to see that all good allocations have the same average on the submatrix
A(r) × [r]. Moreover,
X(F[r]) =
|[r]|
|A(r)|
. (22)
We consider now a dispersion measure with respect to this average denoted
var(F[r]) defined as
var(F[r]) =
∑
i∈A(r)
∑
s∈[r]
(fis −XF[r])
2
|A(r)|
, (23)
and we define the dispersion vector of F by
γ(F ) = (var(F[r1]), var(F[r2]), · · · , var(F[rl+1])). (24)
Using this vector we define a new relation on the set of good allocations.
Definition 12 Let F and G good allocations. We say that F gives more local
satisfaction than G, denoted F γ G, if for all i = 1 · · · l + 1 we have (γ(G))i ≥
(γ(F))i. If for every G ∈ B, we have F ≥γ G, we say that F is locally fair.
We say that F ≻γ G iff F γ G and there exists k such that (γ(G))k >
(γ(F ))k. Whereas F ∼γ G iff for every i = 1 · · · l+1 we have (γ(G))i = (γ(F))i.
It is clear that the relationγ is not a total preorder on B. The following example
illustrates the previous concepts.
Example 2 Let’s go back to example (1) Notice that, A(rm1) = A(r1) = A(r2) =
A(r3) = {1, 2, 3}; A(rm2) = A(r4) = {2, 3}, A(rm3) = A(r5) = {3} and
A(rm4 ) = A(r6) = {1, 2, 3}. It is also easy to check that [rm1 ] = {r1, r2, r3},
[rm2 ] = [r4] = {r4}, [rm3 ] = [r5] = {r5} and [rm4 ] = [r6] = {r6}. Using equation
(22), we have that in A(rm1 )× [rm1 ] the average of any allocation in B is 1; in
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A(rm2 ) × [rm2 ] the average is 1/2; in A(rm3 ) × [rm3 ] the average is 1; whereas
in A(rm4)× [rm4 ] the average is 1/3.
Now by equations (23) and (24) we have the dispersion vectors.
γ(E) = (2, 1/4, 0, 2/9) γ(F) = (2/3, 1/4, 0, 2/9)
γ(G) = (0, 1/4, 0, 2/9) γ(H) = (0, 1/4, 0, 2/9)
Now, according to Definition 12, allocations G and H give more local sat-
isfaction than F which in turn, gives more local satisfaction than E. That is,
G ∼γ H and F ≻γ E. Moreover, it can be shown that G and H are locally fair
allocations.
Although the relation ≥γ is not total on B, we will show that there always
exists a locally fair allocation. We will need the following technical Lemma.
Lemma 8 Let x1, x2, · · · , xn be positive integers. If
n∑
i=1
xi = L, there exists a
natural number β ≤ n− 1, such that
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
xi −
L
n
)2
≥
(n− β)β
n2
(25)
Proof. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi ≥ 1, therefore L ≥ n. Let α and β be the unique
natural numbers such that L =
n∑
i=1
xi = nα+ β with β ∈ {0, · · · , n− 1}. Notice
that, for each i, xi = α or xi = α + 1. If xi = α for every i, then L = nα.
consequently, β = 0 and (25) holds. Now suppose that there exist m natural
numbers such that xi = α + 1. If m = n then
∑n
i=1 xi = nα + n 6= L. Hence,
m < n. On the other hand,
L =
m∑
i=1
xi +
n∑
i=m+1
xi = m(α+ 1) + (n−m)α = nα+m
and therefore, m = β. Now,
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
xi −
L
n
)2
=
1
n
[
m∑
i=1
(
α+ 1− α−
m
n
)2
+
n∑
i=m+1
(
α− α−
m
n
)2]
=
1
n
[
m∑
i=1
(
n−m
n
)2
+
n∑
i=m+1
(m
n
)2]
=
1
n
[
m
(n−m)2
n2
+ (n−m)
m2
n2
]
=
m(n−m)
n2
and since m = β, then equation (25) holds.
Theorem 3 There exists a good allocation F∗ that is locally fair.
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Proof. We want to find F∗ ∈ B such that γ(F∗) ≤ γ(G) for all G ∈ B. Let’s
consider the partition of R as in equation (20).
For each t = 1, . . . , l + 1, there exists unique nonnegative integers αt and βt
such that
|[rmt ]| = |A(rmt)|αt + βt (26)
with βt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |A(rmt)| − 1}.
For each t ∈ {1, . . . l+1}, choose βt agents in A(rmt). Let’s say {j1, . . . jβt} ⊆
A(rmt).
Let’s choose F∗ = (f∗in) ∈ B such that for each t ∈ {1, . . . l + 1},
∑
s∈[rmt ]
f∗js =
{
αrt + 1, if j ∈ {j1, . . . jβt}
αrt , if j ∈ A(rmt) \ {j1, . . . jβt .}
Now, on each submatrix A(rmt)× [rmt ] we have that
X(F∗[rt]) = αrt +
βrt
|A(rt)|
and var(F∗[rt]) = βt
|A(rt)| − βt
|A(rt)|2
.
On the other hand, for every G ∈ B and t = 1, . . . , l + 1, by equations (22)
and (23) we have that
var(G[rmt ]) =
1
|A(rmt)|
|A(r)|∑
i=1

 ∑
s∈[rmt ]
gis −
|[rmt ]|
A(rmt)


2
Finally by Lemma 8,
var(G[rmt ]) ≥ var(F
∗
[rmt ]
)
and consequently, for all G ∈ B
γ(F∗) ≤ γ(G)

The following result tells us that for the good allocations, the dispersion
measure is invariant under any permutation in the submatrix A(r) × [r]. For
instance, in Example 2, the allocations G and H are different in the column 6.
But,
G[rm4 ] =

0 1 01 0 0
0 0 1

H[rm4 ].
Consequently the allocation F∗ in the previous theorem is not necessarily unique.
Proposition 2 Supose that R = [rm1 ] ∪ [rm2 ] ∪ · · · ∪ [rml ] ∪ [rml+1 ], where l is
the number of different equivalent classes of R \ R∗ and [rml+1 ] = R
∗. Let F
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be a good allocation. If Q1, Q2 · · ·Ql+1 are permutation matrices of the identity
I[rmi ] for every i = 1, · · · , l+ 1, then
γ(F) = γ(G)
where G[rmi ] = Qi · F[rmi ] for every i = 1, · · · , l+ 1.
Proof.
γ(F) = (var(F[rm1 ]), var(F[r2]), · · · , var(F[rl+1]))
= (var(Q1 · F[rmi ]), var(Q2 · F[rm2 ], · · · , var(Ql+1 · F[rml+1 ])) = γ(G).
8 Final Remarks
In this work we have tackled the problem of finding a good resource allocation
from a qualitative point of view. A central idea is to use a notion of qualitative
social welfare based on the dominance plausible rule of Dubois et al. [9,10]. The
use of matrix techniques of representation for the relations involved allows us a
better organization of results and a simplification of proofs.
We have generalized the preliminary results presented by Pino Pe´rez et al.
[15,16] in three ways:
1. The hierarchical relation between agents can be now a total preorder instead
of a linear order.
2. The likelihood relation between the resources can be now a total preorder
instead of linear order.
3. The plausibility relation between sets of resources can be now a positive
relation extending the likelihood relation between the resources instead of
only the posibilistic relation considered in [15,16].
Unlike the results in [15,16] in which an optimal allocation is unique, here the
class of optimal allocations can contain more than one element. In this direction,
we have introduced some local techniques and give one technique to globally
compare optimal allocations. A future work is to introduce other techniques
for discriminating these elements. We note that in this work the attitude of an
agent toward a resource is binary, that is, the agent requests or not the resource.
Thus, another generalization of this work could be to consider more complex
representations of the agents’ preferences.
References
1. Salvador Barbera`, Walter Bossert, and Prasanta K Pattanaik. Ranking sets of
objects, volume 2 of Handbook of Utility Theory, chapter 17, pages 893–978. Kluwer
Publisher, 2004.
2. Carmen Bevia´, Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in
economies with indivisible goods, Social Choice and Welfare, (1996) 13:113-126
20 F. Camacho et al.
3. Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol, The
American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 102, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 9-18.
4. Steven J. Brams, Alan D. Taylor and William S. Zwicker, Old and new moving-knife
schemes, Economic Research Reports RR#94-30 (October 1994).
5. Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute
Resolution, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
6. Steven J. Brams, Alan D. Taylor and William S. Zwicker, “A moving-knife solution
to the four-person envy-free cake division problem”, Proceedings of The American
Mathematical Society Volume 125, Number 2, February 1997, Pages 547–554.
7. Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss, Sylvia Estivie and Nicolas Maudet. Reaching Envy-
free States in Distributed Negotiation Settings. In Proceedings of the International
joint Conference in Artificial Intelligence, 2007, pp 1239–1244.
8. Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss, and Nicolas Maudet. Distributed fair allocation of
indivisible goods. Artificial Intelligence, 2017, pp 1–22.
9. Didier Dubois, He´le`ne Fargier, Henri Prade, and Patrice Perny. Qualitative decision
theory: From savage’s axioms to nonmonotonic reasoning. J. ACM, 49:455–495, July
2002.
10. Didier Dubois, He´le`ne Fargier, and Patrice Perny. Qualitative decision theory with
preference relations and comparative uncertainty: An axiomatic approach. Artif.
Intell., 148(1-2):219–260, 2003.
11. Ulle Endriss, Nicolas Maudet, Fariba Sadri and Francesca Tony. Negotiating So-
cially Optimal Allocations of Resources. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research,
25 (2006) 315–348.
12. Herve´ Moulin, Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University
Press, 1988.
13. Herve´ Moulin, Fair division and collective welfare, The MIT Press, 2003.
14. Herve´ Moulin and William Thomson, Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation
Problems, In Social Choice Re-examinated, K. J. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura,
Eds., pp 101–120, International Economic Association, 1997.
15. Ramo´n Pino Pere´z and Jose´ Varela Montilva. Resource allocation under uncer-
tainty: Firt steps towars a qualitative approach. LOFT 2012. Sevilla, Spain, 2012
16. Ramo´n Pino Pere´z, Jose´ Varela Montilva, and Franklin Camacho. Resource al-
location under uncertainty: Firt steps towars a qualitative approach. In Francklin
Rivas Echeverr´ıa and Stalin Arciniegas Aguirre, editors, Avances y aplicaciones de
sistemas inteligentes y nuevas tecnolog´ıas, pages 399–412, 2016.
17. Tuomas W. Sandholm, Contract types for satisficing task allocation: I Theoretical
results. In Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium: Satisficing Models. 1998.
18. Tuomas W. Sandholm, Distributed rational decision making. In Weiß, G. (Ed.),
Multiagent Systems: A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence, pp.
201258. MIT Press, 1999.
19. Hugo Steinhaus, “The problem of fair division”, Econometrica 16 (1948), 101-104.
20. Hugo Steinhaus, “Sur la division pragmatique”, Econometrica (suplement) 17
(1949), 315-319.
21. William Thomson, Fair Allocation Rules, InHandbook of Social Choice and Welfare
Volume 2, Pages 393506, K. J. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura, Eds., Elsevier, 2011.
